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Introduction 
 The European Union (EU) has grown in size and scope since its foundations were laid with 
the founding of the European Economic Community in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. So too have the 
number of people affected by its policies and the concept of shared governance at an international 
level. Over the previous five and a half decades, the expansion of membership to include over half 
a billion people in 28 sovereign member states has been coupled with an extension of the EU’s 
mandate in the social, political and economic activities of the bloc. Although the improvement of 
the lives of EU citizens and the strengthening of EU member state economies have both been 
generally positive outcomes in Europe since 1957, there have been drawbacks in the creation of a 
massive intergovernmental political and economic bloc across a continent that was traditionally 
known for its warfare.1 
 The unprecedented success of the EU has not come without detractors. Particularly evident 
in the most previous European Parliament (EP) election held in May, 2014, was the increased 
focus on euroscepticism by European leaders and policymakers. According to Ariane Apodaca, 
eurosceptics are aptly described as a broad and nebulous range of individual “‘citizens or 
politicians who present themselves as ‘sceptical’ – critical – of the union which they say takes 
powers away from their national government and poses a threat to their national sovereignty.’”2 
Additionally, the ideological spectrum of eurosceptic parties varies quite widely between and 
within states, and not all eurosceptic parties seek the same political ends. There is one unifying 
ideology that unites eurosceptic parties as a whole however: their stance toward continued 
European integration in the context of the EU by creating better-integrated common markets, 
standardizing immigration and foreign policies, creating more cohesive international governance 
structures, and the like.  In the Encyclopedia of the European Union, “Eurosceptic” is defined as 
referring “generally to an opponent of further integration…of the EU.”3 Similarly, Ronald Tiersky 
defines euroscepticism as “a permanent doubting of ‘Europe’ as a great project, a vigilance about 
European integration conceived as building a new and powerful political actor in the international 
system” and asserts that “for Euro-skeptics, the European goal should be a ‘family of nations,’ not 
                                                          
1 European Commission, “The history of the European Union,” European Commission, 2015, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm. 
2Ariane Apodaca, “Information Guide: Euroscepticism” (Academic report, Cardiff University), 3. 
3 Encyclopedia of the European Union, ed. Desmond Dinan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1998), 
s.v.  “Euroskeptic.” 
Ellinger 2 
 
a merging of peoples.”4  While eurosceptic parties hold a minority of seats in the EP – roughly 
13% of the seats (100) are in the grasp of EP groups that already represent eurosceptics5 – there is 
increasing concern among pro-European leaders that this eurosceptic movement could continue to 
gain traction in the future and create difficulties in keeping the EU together as a political and 
economic bloc. Indeed, the success of Syriza in Greece’s parliamentary elections in January 2015, 
sent another clear message to EU leaders in Brussels and other capitals across the continent that 
the matter of transnational fiscal austerity, which has been implemented in a wide range of 
struggling EU economies and has become a hallmark of integrationist economics since the 2009 
European recession, will continue to be challenged at the polls across the bloc.6  
 This paper focuses on the role of young voters in the rise of eurosceptic politicians to EP 
positions from across the EU. I plan to answer two questions in my research project: first, what 
percentage of youth voters aged 18 to 24 at the time of EP elections have voted for eurosceptic 
parties in EP elections from 1994 to 2014? Next, I plan to determine whether economic factors are 
responsible for a change in support for eurosceptic parties at EP elections (if, indeed, such a rise 
in support does exist) by comparing youth unemployment data to support rates for eurosceptic 
parties among youth voters.  
Framing Euroscepticism in the EU 
The implications of my research could be valuable not only to the academic community 
that concerns itself with EU politics and policymaking, but policymakers and politicians 
themselves that see the importance of maintaining youth interest in the EU political and economic 
project’s continued success. An October, 2014, Eurobarometer report on the perception of 
Eurozone constituents (those 18 countries which are part of the EU currency union) about a variety 
of Eurozone social, political and economic issues points to a general contentedness with the euro 
as a currency – 64% of 15-24 year olds were likely to respond that the euro was a good thing for 
their country, compared to 54%-56% of older respondents in the survey.7 There is still hesitation 
                                                          
4 Ronald Tiersky, “Euro-Skepticism and ‘Europe,’” in Euro-Skepticism: A Reader, ed. Ronald Tiersky (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp 2-3. 
5 European Parliament, “Previous Elections,” European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00021/Previous-elections (Accessed April 1, 2015) 
6“Greece’s Election: Beware Greeks Voting for Gifts,” The Economist, January 31, 2015, 17. 
7 TNS Political & Social “The Euro Area: Report” (Economic and social report, European Commission, October, 
2014) 9. 
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to increase coordination of economic and social reforms across the Eurozone at an international 
level, however.8 Nevertheless, the report generally indicates that young people in the Eurozone are 
content with the economic union overall, with a little over half of young respondents providing 
positive responses to questions gauging their support of the single currency area. This information 
is not applicable to the EU overall, but certainly provides some background for my research: the 
Eurozone makes up approximately 64% of the member states in the EU and, with nearly 333 
million inhabitants, approximately 65% of the entire EU population. 
Literature Review 
 It is well-documented that younger voters tend to support alternative methods of political 
expression and political parties that may not fall within the realm of mainstream politics and/or 
political expression, lending credibility to the idea that younger voters may be inclined to vote for 
Eurosceptic parties in EP elections more than other age groups. Sloam substantiates this theory by 
describing how young people are increasingly turning away from traditional political parties and 
politicians, but nevertheless engaging in political activities at increased levels in the EU, an 
important feature of youth participation in politics across the EU.9 Equally important, Flanagan 
argues that “younger citizens are more responsive to their political and socio-economic 
environment than older cohorts,”10 lending credibility to the idea that youth may dabble in politics 
or other forms of political participation that are more radical or outside of the mainstream as they 
form their voting habits. Similarly, Shaffer shows that alternative political appeals can gain traction 
among young voters in his study of neo-fascist music genres created to appeal to young voters in 
the UK during the last quarter of the 20th century; this was observed in the National Front’s 
campaign to increase youth voter turnout for their cause (in the UK, the National Front is a mostly 
defunct neo-Nazi political party).11 By changing their political repertoires from being “less geared 
towards voting and more towards issue-based forms of engagement,” it follows that the more 
narrowly defined political platforms of eurosceptic parties may be more appealing to young voters 
than broad, pro-Europe parties’ appeal across the board. Sloam’s results are also indicative of a 
                                                          
8 Ibid, 50. 
9 James Sloam, “‘Voice and Equality’: Young People’s Politics in the European Union,” West European Politics, 
36:4 (2013): 850, doi:  10.1080/01402382.2012.749652. 
10 Ibid & Flanagan, C. 2009. “Young People’s Civic Engagement and Political Development”. In Handbook of 
Youth and Young Adulthood, Edited by: Furlong, A. 293–300. Abingdon: Routledge. 
11Ryan Shaffer, “The soundtrack of neo-fascism: youth and music in the National Front,” Patterns of Prejudice, 
47:4-5 (2013): 460, doi: 10.1080/0031322X.2013.842289. 
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wider acceptance of anti-establishment politics among younger voters aged 18-24  and can shed 
light on whether young voters are indeed turning out for more eurosceptic parties at EP elections 
than they have in the past. 
 Esser and de Vreese make other important inroads in the study of youth political 
participation and identify a number of outside influences that can affect how younger people vote 
in EP elections.12 They assert lower turnout among young voters is a problem for elections both in 
the United States and the EU, but attribute this to having “less to do with skepticism or opposition 
to the system and more with people’s perception that there is ‘not much at stake’” in major 
elections that used to have higher levels of turnout in both the United States and the EU.13 This is 
important to note: Euractiv, an EU news and policy forum, made a claim prior to the EP elections 
in May 2014 that the role of young voters may significantly change in the 2014 election cycle due 
to the continued level of economic instability across the EU and persistently high rates of youth 
unemployment in various member states.14 The claim that there is not much at stake is broad in 
the context of pan-European elections, and potentially inaccurate; the economic policies pushed 
by elected MEPs from May 2014 will no doubt be important to consider as Europe continues its 
shaky economic recovery in the coming years. The EP elections in May 2014 could signal a shift 
in younger citizens’ voting patterns, turning around the consistent decline of youth involvement in 
EP elections that has been observed since the first open elections to the EP in 1979.15 
It is worth pointing out that the Esser & de Vreese article was published before the global 
financial and economic meltdown of 2007-2008 and the subsequent recessions that gripped the 
European continent in following years. This adds a previously unforeseen variable into their 
research results when analyzing them in a contemporary context and it follows that radicalization 
of the youth vote may have been more prominent in Europe following publication than the authors 
considered.  The addition of two more EP elections since 2008 and the associated ascendance of 
eurosceptic parties, en masse, into the EP have provided opportunities for younger voters to turn 
                                                          
12 Frank Esser & Claes H. de Vreese, “Comparing Young Voters’ Political Engagement in the United States and 
Europe,” American Behavioral Scientist, 50:9 (2007): 1197. doi: 10.1177/0002764207299364. 
13 Ibid, 1208. 
8 “Frustrated young voters could reverse declining turnout in EU elections,” last modified June 3, 2013, 
http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/frustrated-young-voters-reverse-news-528254. 
15 “Turnout at the European elections (1979-2009),” last modified May, 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
aboutparliament/en/ 000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html. 
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out at the polls across the EU to affect change for a variety of important issues that were and are 
at stake. 
It is also necessary to understand the way that eurosceptic parties work in the context of 
pan-EU politics and the reasons that voters find them attractive in the first place. Adam & Maier, 
et al. go into detail on this matter by examining the results of the 2009 EP elections and the role 
that “eurosceptic fringe” parties had in that cycle compared to more traditional EU political parties 
that gain the majority of voters’ support at the international (read: EU) level of government. 16 The 
2009 election, which occurred during the height of the economic crisis in Europe following the 
2007-2008 collapse of the global financial system, was a litmus test of sorts for the EU. It did not 
put eurosceptic politicians into significant power by any means, but the 2009 EP election cycle did 
allow voters to express their distaste for then-current austerity measures and EU-wide reforms that 
were being discussed to address the economic concerns of the day.17 Many EU countries are still 
facing acutely high youth unemployment and low levels of economic growth – particularly in the 
Eurozone – and this makes it even more important to understand whether or not young voters who 
will be electing future European Parliaments have been moved to vote for politicians that may not 
have a closely united Europe in mind. 
Adam & Maier, et al. provide a departure point from previous literature on the issue of EP 
elections: the 2009 election was the first time that the EP was given a post-crisis mandate, which 
may have changed the entire paradigm of the elections among younger voters. Particularly for 
those voters who came of age during the periods of recession and economic crisis in the Eurozone 
and, more broadly, the EU, the success of eurosceptic parties in the 2009 election is important to 
note. Both the 2009 and 2014 EP elections allowed voters who lived through the economic crisis’s 
first few years and the subsequent slow recovery to express their opinions about the European 
Commission’s and European Parliament’s responses to the economic issues which were and are 
plaguing the bloc. Treib focuses on the May 2014 election in detail, and notes the importance of 
distinguishing between hard line and softer approaches that eurosceptic parties take to the EU, 
arguing that contemporary political scientists would do well to take heed of the turnout for 
                                                          
16Adam, Silke & Michaela Maier, et al., “Campaigning Against Europe? The Role of Eurosceptic Fringe and 
Mainstream Parties in the 2009 European Parliament Election,” Journal of Political Marketing, 12:1 (2013): 80, doi: 
10.1080/15377857.2013.752245. 
17Oliver Treib, “The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 
European elections,” Journal of European Public Policy, 21:10 (2014): 1543, doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.941534. 
Ellinger 6 
 
eurosceptics at the polls.18 The works by Adam & Maier, as well as Treib, are also supportive of 
the idea that eurosceptic parties can be classified according to their stance on European integration. 
19  
I consider Betz’s 2013 discussion of 19th century American populist parties as “distant 
mirrors” for contemporary European populist movements to be a nontraditional approach to 
populist party movement studies, and his research raises serious questions about what drives 
populist movements into power in democratic systems.20 Betz’s work is focused primarily on anti-
immigrant sentiment among voters in France, namely in support of the Front National (a 
eurosceptic French political party) led by Marine Le Pen. In the 2014 EP elections, the Front 
National beat every other French political party in the poll, garnering 24.68% of the national vote 
and 23 seats in the EP. Although not all eurosceptic political parties and politicians reside in the 
ideological “populist right” – as Betz defines the Front National 21 – his definition of Western 
European populist right parties is helpful for understanding (1) how these parties market 
themselves to voters in order to increase turnout in favor of their candidates in elections and (2) 
the influences that may be affecting young voters’ voting behavior in EP elections.22  
Significance of Original Research 
Each of the aforementioned researchers tended to limit their cases studied in a variety of 
ways. Betz, for instance, focuses primarily on American anti-Catholic movements of the late 19th 
century to draw parallels to the anti-immigration ideology of the French Front National and the 
Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in recent years. Adam & Maier, et al., are also limited in the scope of 
their study, focusing on the 2009 EP election in only 11 EU member states, with the focus of their 
research directed at the placement of the eurosceptic parties in question on an ideological scale 
from “fringe” to “mainstream” in nature.23 Similarly, Esser & de Reese wrote their article in the 
mid-2000s, before the accession of the most recent three members of the EU to the bloc, and limit 
their results to 24 of the current EU member states as it was. 
                                                          
18 Treib, “The voter says no,” 1543. 
19 Adam & Maier, “Campaigning Against Europe,” 81, 83-87. 
20 Hans-Georg Betz, “A Distant Mirror: Nineteenth-Century Populism, Nativism, and Contemporary Right-Wing 
Radical Politics,” Democracy and Security, 9:3 (2013): 201, doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.792250. 
21 Ibid, 201. 
22 Ibid, 202. 
23 Adam & Maier, “Campaigning Against Europe,” 78. 
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In this paper I examine the eurosceptic vote in eight EU member states in EP elections 
from 1994-2014, with a focus on the youth vote in each EP election cycle. There is a large amount 
of work that has focused on the rise of euroscepticism over the past 20 years, but it is notable that 
there has been a lack of attention paid to the role of youth voters in the rise and election of 
eurosceptic politicians and parties in Europe, particularly in regard to EP elections. The dismally 
low turnout at EP elections has been widely documented across the EU; the turnout rate in the 
2014 EP election was around 43% of eligible voters, a phenomenon Treib attributes to the “second-
order nature” of pan-European elections.24 Thus, measuring actual voter sentiment based on less 
than half the electorate’s population is a difficult task. 
Research Variables and Hypotheses 
Based on previous research, I hypothesize that young voters up to age 24 (the legal 
minimum age for voting in EP elections varies from 16-18 across the 28 EU member states) have 
increased their support for eurosceptic party candidates in EP elections. As part of my secondary 
hypothesis, I assess youth unemployment data in the two quarters preceding and following the EP 
elections in each member state since 1993. Across the EU, I believe that there will be a wide 
variation in reasons for young voters’ attraction to eurosceptic parties, but propose here that 
economic factors play a large role in the decision to vote for eurosceptics when young voters head 
to the polls. Where appropriate, and if the requisite data is available, I will list the primary reasons 
for a voter’s choice at the voting booth. 
I used comprehensive post-electoral European Election Studies (EES) survey data to track 
voting trends across my case studies.25 The EES program records political, social, economic, 
educational, opinion, employment, and other data of voting populations for European Commission 
after each EP election. All of my data, except where otherwise noted, is accessible from EES 
through the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. 
Measures and Methods 
The first question I have posed addresses the matter of whether or not youth voters are 
supporting eurosceptic parties and to what extent that support is being expressed at the polls in EP 
                                                          
24 Treib 1547 Voter says no 2014 
25 http://eeshomepage.net/home/ 
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elections based on voter age. To examine the voting patterns of different age groups, I have divided 
each EES respondent pool into the following age ranges: 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and 
65+. These divisions isolate youth voters from other age ranges of EU voters and enable me to 
determine the extent to which their votes went to eurosceptic parties in EP elections. Preliminary 
data observations indicated that most data agencies (EuroBarometer, Euractiv, the European Social 
Survey [ESS]) tabulate age ranges in a similar fashion.  
The first dependent variable (DV) under consideration is the demonstrated support by 
young voters for eurosceptic parties. Because each member state has its own political parties that 
contest the EP elections, classifying eurosceptic parties in each state is vital to my analysis.26 In 
each EP election since 1979, EES has collected party manifestos from political parties contesting 
the elections (data is available up to 2009; the 2014 party data information will be released in late 
2015). Among its “Euromanifesto” questions EES scores the stance of each party on European 
integration on a 1-10 scale, whereby a score of “1” indicates a party is in favor of full European 
integration and a score of “10” indicates a party’s opposition to any integration. Few parties score 
either a “1” or a “10,” but some parties like the UK Independence Party are in favor of exiting the 
EU entirely. For this paper, all parties which scored a “6” or higher on the EES Euromanifesto 
question of integration support in each electoral cycle will be considered Eurosceptic. (See table 
A-1 in the appendix for comprehensive party data.) For the 2014 elections I use the eurosceptic 
party table compiled by Treib in place of the as-yet missing EES Euromanifesto data.27 Once 
eurosceptic parties are identified, the vote share of each party is cross-tabulated with voter age and 
the total voter turnout from each EES survey; n values for respondents vary across survey years 
and member states and are noted in the data.  
 I have chosen to begin my study with the 1994 EP elections for two reasons. First, I seek 
to establish whether there is a notable change in youth support for eurosceptic parties, and a rich 
set of electoral data is available for the five EP elections since 1994. Secondly, beginning the study 
in 1994 allows for a number of member states to accede to the EU throughout the study period. 
The accession of Eastern European members on a “fast-track” process that has not been offered to 
other potential member states, even if those Eastern European political and economic systems were 
not “prepared” for access to the EU, did produce some ire among Western Europeans in the mid-
                                                          
26 Adam & Maier, “Campaigning Against Europe,” 80-81. 
27 Treib, “The Voter Says No,” (2014) 1544-1545. 
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2000s.28  However, in examining the long-term trend in youth voting behavior, it is possible to 
establish a better understanding of the appeal of eurosceptic parties among young voter populations 
that has not previously been examined in great detail. This is not a point I analyze in my study, but 
it is worth noting for future research. 
The follow-up question I study is what factors are driving the change, if one does exist, in 
young voters’ behavior at the polls. I hypothesize that unemployment is the primary factor for anti-
EU sentiment and the voting habits among young voters in EP elections. An argument can be made 
for such a relationship based on previous elections both in and outside of the EU that appear to 
show a relationship between economic hardship and political regime change; the US Presidential 
election of 1932 is shown by Courtney Brown to have served as a vote of support for either 
President Hoover’s response to the Great Depression or Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proposals to bring 
relief to poverty-stricken Americans.29 The latter years of the German Weimar Republic are 
similar: in that time of economic and political turmoil, marked by a slow response of the 
government to the Great Depression, the political system of the country fell apart and allowed the 
National Socialists (Nazis) to gain traction in the Bundestag. Younger voters, particularly those 
bitter about the old vanguard government’s policies concerning war reparations and the dismal 
economic situation, rallied behind the new nationalist leaders of Germany and allowed the Nazis 
to gradually take control of the state.30 Other examples of youth voters’ impact on political 
situations and movements can also be observed across the West: the 1960s student movements and 
more recent protests against austerity measures in the UK, Greece, France, Spain and other EU 
member states have increased the visibility of young voters’ political concerns and may have had 
an impact on the turnout in the 2014 EP elections among younger voters. 
To conduct examine this second question, I compare youth unemployment data with 
eurosceptic party success in the EP elections by case and year. This data, available from EuroStat,31 
provides a point of comparison for economic factors that may be affecting young voters’ behaviors 
in the polls. The previously mentioned Eurobarometer and European Social Survey data provided 
                                                          
28 Jan-Werner Müller, “Eastern Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the EU's Newest Members,” Foreign 
Affairs, March/April, 2014, accessed December 5, 2014, http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140736/jan-werner-
mueller/eastern-europe-goes-south. 
29 Courtney Brown, “Mass Dynamics of U.S. Presidential Competitions, 1928-1936,” American Political Science 
Review, 82:4 (1988): 1154. 
30 Dick Geary, “Who Voted for the Nazis?” History Today, 48:10 (1998): 9.  
31 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database 
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me the basis of this means of comparison. Additionally, future research can compare their plethora 
of quantitative data about social perceptions of immigrants and non-European wage-earners in the 
EU to determine whether or not they are impacting the eurosceptic vote in EP elections. 
 My preliminary review of news and academic journal pieces detailing the role that youth 
voters play in EP elections has revealed a lack of serious investigation into these matters. Euractiv, 
a policy analysis network that examines European politics and promotes debate about a range of 
issues pertaining to the EU does share data that details the decline in youth participation in EP 
elections, with a low of 29% turnout across the EU in the 2009 EP election.32 However, preliminary 
articles, even a year in advance of the 2014 election, indicated that there was a high likelihood that 
the turnout of youth voters would significantly increase due to the fact that the economic downturn 
still haunting the EU had hit younger people particularly hard in the southern member states, 
primarily Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and Cyprus, and to a lesser extent, other members of the 
EU across the board.33 
Case Study Selection 
 I selected eight EU member states for analysis that would provide plenty of data to work 
with and also some variation in historical, political, social, economic and other backgrounds. 
Additionally, my independent variables – voter age and unemployment rates – were established to 
determine whether a correlational link exists between them and eurosceptic party support; this is 
discussed in greater detail below I formulated my project based on the 2014 EP election and 
worked back in time to select my cases on a variety of national variables.  
 First, I determined which EU member states had elected a eurosceptic party to the EP in 
2014, based on Treib’s eurosceptic party table (see Appendix, Table A-1) that records 
eurosceptic parties present in the 2014-2019 EP.34  
 Next, I figured unemployment data for under-25s from the last two quarters of the year 
preceding each EP election, as well as the first two quarters of the election year (See Figure 
A-3, below). EP elections are held in June each year studied with the exception of 2014, 
when they were held in May. For my data comparisons, I have averaged youth 
                                                          
32 “Frustrated young voters could reverse declining turnout in EU elections.” 
33 “EU elections 2014: Online tool aims to get the youth voting,” last modified September 20, 2013, 
http://www.euractiv.com/eu-elections-2014/online-tool-aims-get-youngsters-news-530584. 
34 Treib, “The Voter Says No,” (2014) 1544-1545.  
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unemployment from the four quarters studied, providing approximately a year during 
which youth unemployment may stabilize and potentially affect voters’ mindsets.  
 Working backward again, I divided states into five tiers based on the average 
unemployment in the last four quarters: 10-20%, 20-30%, 30-40%, 40-50% and 50-60%. 
Each state analyzed also demonstrated a notable change in unemployment over the 20 year 
period. At least one state was chosen from each tier. 
 Given the many rounds of EU accession, I sought to include as many European regions as 
possible in the study. Five of the eight cases had been participating in EP elections since 
1979, and the remaining cases were selected from the 1997 and 2004 rounds of accession. 
This provided me with Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern European states to work 
with. Ultimately, I chose to study the following eight EU members: the Czech Republic 
(CZ), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and 
the United Kingdom (UK). Other states met my selection criteria, but were excluded due 
to my lack of resources to complete this project. 
For ES, FR, IT, PT and the UK, elections from 1994 to the present were assessed; SE was 
assessed from 1999, and both CZ and PL were assessed from 2004.  
Data and Plan of Analysis 
 
As previously mentioned, all electoral data used in my research was made available by the 
EES databases housed at the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. I have compiled the electoral 
statistics for eurosceptic parties by case and age across the relevant 3-5 EP electoral cycles, 
followed by figures showing the change in eurosceptic support among various age groups and then 
comparing youth unemployment, averaged over the four quarters preceding and including the 
relevant EP election, to the degree of youth support for eurosceptic parties at the polls. Figure A-
3 tracks the youth unemployment rates in the previously defined periods that was used to determine 
case selection. (The full dataset can be found in the Appendix, Table A-2.) 
There is a variety of eurosceptic parties studied in each electoral cycle, but each party 
studied up to and during the 2009 EP election had a minimum score of “6” on the integration 
perception scale as part of the EES Euromanifesto study. The full list of eurosceptic parties can be 
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found in Figure A-1.1 in the appendix for each case study, I name at least one prominent 
eurosceptic party that has contested at least two elections unless otherwise noted. 
 It is necessary to point out that there is a vast range in the number of individuals interviewed 
during each EES study. This creates an inherent problem in my data and analysis: one cannot hope 
to get an entirely representative picture of EP electoral habits broken down by age groups over the 
previous twenty years. The number of potential voters interviewed after each EP election ranges 
from a low of 500 in Portugal in 1999 to a high of 9708 in Italy during the same cycle. This spread 
in respondent numbers is representative of the voting populations of EU member states, but does 
create a lack of information about my target group of analysis. Given the nature of this type of 
research, however, such misrepresentations in the data are impossible to overcome without 
creating an entirely new and more representative survey for EU citizens to complete.   
 The shortcomings of this data are most apparent in the calculation of voter turnout: it has 
already been mentioned that EP elections see regularly underwhelming turnout rates given their 
second-tier nature, but the EES survey data indicates a much higher turnout for the EP elections 
than was actually recorded in each election cycle. To clarify, the turnout reported by the European 
Commission in the 2014 EP election was 42.61% across the bloc. In the EES data, much higher 
turnout is indicated among most of the countries than was officially recorded: Italy, whose official 
turnout in the 2014 EP election was recorded as 57.22% by the European Commission, registered 
a 68.63% turnout rate in the EES data. The EP publishes EP election turnout data on their official 
website which is free and open to the public at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-
results/en/turnout.html. . 
 Bearing all this in mind, the results yielded by my study should be taken as a guide to youth 
support for eurosceptic parties, nor an official statement about the state of youth electoral politics 
in the EU. 
Analysis 
 Voter support for eurosceptic parties varies greatly across the chosen cases, warranting an 
independent discussion of each in its own context. To establish relationships between voter 
support for eurosceptics by age and youth unemployment, I have chosen to assess each state 
separately, including some contextual historical and political background information to clarify 
each case’s situation at the time of their election. It was also notable in the data that there is a 
range of support levels among the different age cohorts (see Appendix B), making it practical to 
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speculate on the reasons for those outcomes and why youth support for eurosceptics may or may 
not have met my initial expectations. The countries are grouped into two typologies: those that 
have experienced youth unemployment below 25% on average over the past 20 years, and those 
that have experienced unemployment above the 25% threshold since 1994. More detailed 
analysis will be provided for one state of each category: France (over 25%) and the United 
Kingdom (under 25%). 
Unemployment over 25% 
France 
The history of French nationalism stretches back hundreds of years and continues to this 
day under the leadership of the incredibly eurosceptic Marine Le Pen and her Front National 
political party.35 Front National won the 2014 EP election in France with 24.86% of the vote.36 
Although this individual vote differs from the results shown by the EES data, there has nevertheless 
been an increase in eurosceptic party support across France in the 20 years analyzed. Young voters 
are not the drivers of this increase in eurosceptic success at EP elections in France; rather, older 
voters in the 55-64 and 65+ year old cohorts are pushing up eurosceptic election rates there. There 
is a link between youth unemployment and the percentage of youth reporting having voted for 
eurosceptic parties, but it is not incredibly strong. For example, the increase from 3.27% to 5.56% 
of total youth voting for eurosceptic parties between 2004 and 2014 amounts to a 70% increase in 
youth support for eurosceptic parties overall, but this is not closely correlated to the increase in 
under-25 unemployment from 20% to 24% over the same period, a marginal increase of 20% 
overall.  
Spain 
Spain has experienced dramatic fluctuations in youth unemployment since 1994, 
particularly since the global financial crisis of 2007-2008; it has had the steepest increase in youth 
unemployment since 2009 among my case selections. Interestingly, in this case, unemployment 
correlates well with the increase with eurosceptic support among young voters. Currently, Spanish 
youth remain among the most likely to be unemployed anywhere in the EU with unemployment 
                                                          
35 Lars-Erik Cederman, et. al, “Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization, and the Severity of War,” 
International Organization, 65:4 (2011): 606, doi: 10.1017/S0020818311000205. 
35 Treib, “The Voter Says No,” (2014) Ibid, 201. 
36 European Parliament, “Previous Elections.”  
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hovering between 53-54% at the time of the 2014 EP election. Spain does not appear to have a 
strong record of support for eurosceptic parties, but there is a notable uptick in youth support at 
the 2014 elections. During this cycle, Podemos (Spanish for “we can”) became a prominent party 
on the eurosceptic scene in Spain, garnering approximately 10.2% of the vote among Spanish 
voters  
Italy 
Italy has a history of eurosceptic parties contesting EP elections since at least 1994 the 
hard-eurosceptic Lega Nord (Northern League) has consistently received sufficient support at the 
polls to get some candidates into the EP. Youth cohorts in Italy have shown a slow but steady 
increase in eurosceptic party support. The lack of a drastic increase in youth support for eurosceptic 
parties overall appears as if it will continue in future EP election cycles.  
Poland 
Poland joined the EU in 2004. Immediately, there was a large showing of support for 
eurosceptic parties – over 30% in the 2004 cycle – but this has since Among the early Polish 
eurosceptic parties was the League of Polish Families which came in second place in the 2004 
elections; it has since lost clout in Poland, representing a decrease in the level of support that has 
been observed among Polish voters for eurosceptic parties in the past ten years. The youth vote 
share for electing eurosceptic tracks with unemployment rates among the under-25 population. In 
general, the Poles do not turn out en masse for the EP elections – the EES data never figures turnout 
above 45.85% and official EP data records an average turnout under 25% in each cycle. 
Portugal  
Portuguese euroscepticism is weak, at best. Those eurosceptic parties that do succeed in 
Portuguese EP elections are generally leftist: the Left Bloc and the Unitarian Democratic Coalition 
(comprised of communist and Green elements) have been the most successful Portuguese 
eurosceptics since 1999. For a time, youth unemployment and the percentage of youth voting for 
eurosceptic parties were closely correlated, but in the 2014 cycle this relationship appeared to end: 
a marginal increase of 50% in under-25 unemployment from 24% to 36% from 2009 to 2014 stands 
in stark contrast to the 76.4% drop in youth support for eurosceptic parties between the two 
elections.  
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Unemployment under 25% 
United Kingdom  
The relationship between the UK and the EU has frequently been fraught with tension. 
Former Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was very hesitant about integrating the 
UK into broad EU political, economic and monetary agreements; the current PM David Cameron 
(also a Conservative) has repeatedly promised a referendum on the UK’s membership in the EU if 
his party wins the May 2015 parliamentary elections.37 With the addition of the fiercely anti-
integration UK Independence Party (UKIP) and other, smaller eurosceptic parties in the UK, the 
British eurosceptic movement is alive and well. There is still a notable lack of support for 
eurosceptic parties and politicians amongst youth populations, and the contribution of youth votes 
to eurosceptic party success has consistently been well under 10%. There is not a distinguishable 
relationship between youth unemployment and the degree of youth support for eurosceptic parties 
in the UK.  
Czech Republic 
 The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004 The country has seen stable youth 
unemployment between 10-20% since accession and has embraced the democratic norms of its 
western counterparts since democratization following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
The slight increase in youth support as a share of eurosceptic party success in 2014 appears 
attributable to the decline in the support such parties earned from 25-45 year olds and the 65+ year 
old population. Also notable is the vast drop in overall eurosceptic vote shares from the general 
election, among the most precipitous declines in the entire study. The change in support from 
2004-2009, correlated to unemployment, hints at a trend that would support my hypothesis, but it 
rapidly disappears in the 2014 EP election cycle.  
Sweden 
Sweden joined the EU in 1998. The country has seen consistent support for eurosceptic 
parties since accession, particularly among the 55-64 year old cohort. Youth support has been on 
the decline since Sweden’s inaugural EP election in 1999, and the percentage of youth voting for 
Swedish eurosceptic parties has varied ever since. Youth support for eurosceptic parties does not 
track well as a share of the youth population with under-25 unemployment rates. There is a 
                                                          
37 BBC, “Milliband: EU poll is ‘clear and present danger’ to jobs,” BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-
32114191 (Accessed March 31, 2015). 
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consistent show of support for the eurosceptic Swedish Green Party (Miljöpartiet) and, to a lesser 
extent, the June-List Party (Junilistan) in EP elections overall.  
Discussion of Results and Data 
With the sole exception of the Czech Republic, there does appear to be a general increase 
in youth support for eurosceptic parties in EP elections across the cases studied in this analysis. 
Many would dismiss this increase in youth support as miniscule, and such critics would be correct: 
there is no increase larger than single digits in the eight cases studied here. Furthermore, the UK 
stands out as the only case in which more than 20% of the youth vote ever went to eurosceptic 
parties, as observed in the 2009 election (Figure B-8.2). Nonetheless, there are indications that 
youth support for eurosceptic parties is generally higher than it was ten or twenty years ago. The 
tendency of youth to support nontraditional political parties and engage in nontraditional means of 
political expression is probably partly to blame for this increase in youth eurosceptic support. From 
personal experience watching the campaigns for the EP while living in Europe in May, 2014, it 
was apparent that many eurosceptic politicians were not – and are not – afraid to engage in 
nontraditional means of political engagement and may even push the boundaries of acceptable 
discourse in the public sphere. Not only is the heavy burden of a pan-European economy weighing 
on the minds of these parties and politicians, but so too is the problem of integration – of border 
policies, social norms and customs, currency and trade. As the elections in 2014 clearly 
demonstrated, the frustration of voters in EP elections with integration is on the rise and 
eurosceptic parties benefited handsomely from their anti-integration stances.  
 Regardless of the increase in eurosceptic parties’ success at the polls, there is no indication 
that this has been significantly affected by younger voter support over the previous five election 
cycles. Rather, the largest shares of eurosceptic votes generally belong to older cohorts across the 
cases studied in this analysis:  The Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK each 
saw the 55-64 and 65+ year old age groups as making up the largest share of eurosceptic party 
votes in 2014 specifically and throughout the series more broadly (See Appendix B). Italy is one 
of the outliers here – rather than older voters, middle-aged voters of the 35-44 year old cohort and, 
to a lesser extent, the 45-54 year old cohort, were the largest contributors to eurosceptic parties’ 
vote shares in most elections (Figure B-4.1). France appears to follow the pattern of older voters 
being the most important factor in eurosceptic parties’ success, but there is an anomalous lack of 
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eurosceptic support among the oldest voting cohort in 2009 (Figure B-3.1) that is partly due to the 
small number of cases in the polling data from EES. I find the EES data for Spain to fluctuate 
enough that its representation not  be of much use here, but it is important to note the rise of 
Podemos in the 2014 elections and the impact that a viable eurosceptic party had on the elections 
there (Figure B-2.1). 
According to The Economist, the eurosceptics now control about a third of the 751 seats in 
the EP, of which approximately 100 are held by hardline eurosceptics advocating for extensive EU 
reform or abandoning the EU altogether.38 While trends show an increase in eurosceptic party 
support across the EU as a whole, particularly in those states that have the biggest grievances with 
the central international government in Brussels, it is important to remember that the majority of 
the MEPs are still committed to a united Europe that will last well into the future. There were only 
64 hard eurosceptic MEPs elected in 2009 when solely defined by their EP party group in 2009, 
compared to 100 in 2014, amounting to 8.63 % and 13.32% of the total seats in each parliament, 
respectively.39 Although hard eurosceptics have been unable to create, or have thus far refused to 
join, coalitions capable of making lasting EU-wide changes, particularly as Europe moves toward 
further integration in upcoming years, these increases are important to note: hard eurosceptics’ 
increased popularity tracks with the growing movement of mid-range and softer eurosceptics 
overall. The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) coalition is the largest purely 
eurosceptic group in the EP today, led by Nigel Farage of UKIP, which was among the most 
successful eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections; the Front National’s MEPs have thus far 
refused to align themselves with any political coalition.40 
 In light of the general, wide-ranging success of eurosceptic parties in the 2014 EP elections, 
there exists a real possibility that a renewed faith in the EU may grow among young voters. As I 
noted earlier, the EuroBarometer survey of October 2014 indicated a generally positive response 
to the EU among younger populations in the Eurozone and this may be representative of a larger 
growth in support for the EU than my hypotheses give young voters credit for. I believe that this 
is made evident by the fact that even though unemployment has increased in many EU states, there 
has not been a similar increase in eurosceptic votes among youth populations. This generally 
                                                          
38 The Economist, “The Eurosceptic Union.” 
39 European Parliament, “Previous Elections.” 
40 Ibid. 
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undermines my second hypothesis: that increasing unemployment among under-25s would result 
in higher turnout among youth voters for eurosceptic parties. Rather, it appears that youth have 
continued to vote for parties more in favor of further European integration. Of course, more 
research will be necessary to prove this hypothesis on its own and to see how it fares in future EP 
elections. 
 One of the limitations in this entire study has been the lack of wide-ranging survey data 
available for youth voting populations. Although EP election turnout has historically been low, it 
appears to be especially so among young voters as evidenced by the EES data. I know of no other 
accessible data source with the type and range of information that EES has made available to the 
public, but even more thorough state-by-state post-electoral survey data for young voters would 
be useful for future analyses of youth voters’ voting habits. Better data may be available through 
the Eurobarometer survey, but this data also has its limitations – it surveys more people than the 
EES, but also poses the problems of age representation, political ideology, and the like when 
selecting participants. Based on EES survey results, it does not appear as if the rise of eurosceptic 
parties will be one fueled by the youngest voters, but as voters age there is a definite possibility 
that they will move further toward eurosceptic parties and their candidates for MEP seats. One will 
have to wait and see whether this is the case.  
Conclusion 
Within the limitations imposed the data I had access to, my assessment of EES electoral 
data has shed light on a surprisingly under studied aspect of EU democracy: the role of youth 
voters in putting eurosceptic parties and politicians into power in the EP. Although a plethora of 
research and information exists about the meteoric rise of eurosceptic parties and politicians in the 
EP, I think it is noteworthy that young peoples’ role in this rise has not been studied in greater 
depth to this point in time. Particularly in the post-Soviet era, when all of the young voters today 
have grown up in the radically different post-Soviet paradigm than previous generations of 
Europeans, it is important to understand why young voters may have misgivings about a united 
Europe. Part of this may be due to the fact that today’s youth never grew up in that Soviet paradigm 
their parents and grandparents remember so well, but going even further back is the matter of the 
World Wars that tore Europe apart. Clearly, the older cohorts are more attuned to the destruction 
that World War II wrought in Europe, either through familial memory or personal experience. The 
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effects of globalization have almost certainly had a reciprocal impact among youth voters: they 
are far more interconnected with their European neighbors than their parents or grandparents ever 
were through the internet and mobile telecommunications. This would be a good departure point 
for future researchers.  
 The need to understand youth voting habits may not be as important to academic 
researchers as I make it out to be in the case of EU voters, but the way in which parties connect 
with young voters can have an effect on how those voters continue to engage in political expression 
throughout their lifetimes. If more radical or nontraditional parties develop a surefire way to appeal 
to younger voters, they may ultimately gain enough seats in the EP to craft and pass legislation 
that would affect the EU’s 500 million or so inhabitants: engaging voters at a young age and 
keeping them devoted to a party is an effective means for maintaining support and growing it 
among new, younger cohorts for each subsequent electoral cycle. If the parties cannot get that far, 
then at least they may turn into a powerful force to be reckoned with in the future. Overall, there 
is room for deeper studies of youth voting behavior in Europe, and particularly in today’s context 
of having lived through the economic crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s. If the influences of 
these factors on youth voters are as relevant as I believe they are, then there may be very interesting 
years ahead for the EU as political and economic project. Researchers and European policymakers 
would both do well to watch the voting trends amongst young voters: the trickling increase in 
support for eurosceptics does pose the potential for an ever-larger increase in youth support for 
these parties and politicians, and if such an outpouring for support does occur then it should come 
as no surprise. Young voters today have learned some of the harder lessons of a united Europe and 
may not look forward to sticking together with neighbors and allies that they see as dragging them 
down economically, culturally or politically. 
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Appendix A 
Table A-1: 
Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European Parliament  
Adapted from: Treib, Oliver, "The voter says no, but nobody listens: causes and consequences of  
the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European elections," Journal of European Public Policy, 21:10. 
2014. 
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.941534  
Country PARTY NAME ORIENTATION 
(LEFT/RIGHT) 
SCEPTICISM: 
HARD/SOFT 
CZ Communist Party L S 
 Party of Free Citizens R H 
 Civic Democratic Party R S 
    
ES United Left L S 
 Podemos L S 
    
FR Left Front L S 
 National Front R H 
    
IT The Other Europe L S 
 Five Star Movement Center S 
 Lega Nord R H 
    
PL Law and Justice R S 
 Congress of New Right R H 
 Right Wing of the Republic R H 
    
PT Democratic Unitarian Coalition L S 
 Left Bloc L S 
    
SE Left Party L S 
 Sweden Democrats R H 
 Greens L S 
    
UK Sinn Fein L S 
 UKIP R H 
 Conservatives R S 
 Democratic Unionist Party R S 
    
* Based off of Treib (2014), see citation in paper draft* 
**EES Data unavailable until late 2015; may be updated at such time that information is accessible** 
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Table A-2: 
Youth Quarterly Unemployment - 1993 Q3 through 2014 Q2 
  
  
Last update 05.03.15          
Extracted on 07.03.15          
Source of data Eurostat          
           
S_ADJ Seasonally adjusted data        
AGE Less than 25 years         
SEX Total          
           
GEO/TIME 1993Q3 1993Q4 1994Q1 1994Q2 1998Q3 1998Q4 1999Q1 1999Q2 2003Q3 2003Q4 
CZ 8.4 8.1 8.4 8.8 13.2 14.7 16.4 16.7 17.8 19.0 
ES 42.0 42.5 43.2 42.8 31.9 30.5 28.4 27.0 22.7 22.7 
FR 33.9 35.2 36.0 35.8 37.7 38.1 38.6 38.3 18.8 20.0 
IT 28.3 29.7 28.8 29.0 29.2 30.4 29.9 29.0 23.3 22.2 
PL : : : : 22.7 24.3 26.8 29.1 42.4 41.3 
PT 15.3 15.7 16.4 17.0 13.9 13.5 13.3 13.5 18.7 19.6 
SE 24.1 24.1 23.6 22.2 16.0 14.3 13.4 12.5 17.4 19.0 
UK 17.4 17.3 16.7 16.6 13.1 13.3 13.0 13.0 12.2 11.7 
GEO/TIME 2004Q1 2004Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2013Q3 2013Q4 2014Q1 2014Q2 
CZ 19.8 20.4 9.7 10.1 13.1 15.6 19.0 19.0 16.8 16.3 
ES 22.2 22.4 25.2 29.4 34.4 37.2 55.7 54.9 54.2 53.1 
FR 20.2 20.3 19.2 20.5 22.9 23.9 24.7 23.6 23.8 23.6 
IT 23.2 24.4 21.8 22.3 24.1 24.6 40.7 42.2 43.2 42.6 
PL 41.5 40.4 16.3 17.2 18.2 19.7 27.2 27.2 25.7 24.2 
PT 19.3 19.3 21.7 22.8 24.2 25.2 37.8 35.7 35.8 36.0 
SE 20.1 20.5 20.1 20.9 22.4 24.9 23.3 22.7 23.4 23.3 
UK 11.7 11.8 15.4 16.4 17.9 19.2 21.0 19.7 18.8 16.8 
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Figure A-3 
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Appendix B 
Czech Republic 
Figure B-1 2.1: 
CZECH REPUBLIC – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 15 3.59% 11 2.16% 6 1.57% 
25-34 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 43 10.29% 29 5.69% 8 2.09% 
35-44 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 42 10.05% 44 8.63% 14 3.66% 
45-54 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 51 12.20% 35 6.86% 15 3.93% 
55-64 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 59 14.11% 42 8.24% 16 4.19% 
65+ 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 50 11.96% 60 11.76% 17 4.45% 
Eurosceptic Vote 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 260 62.20% 221 43.33% 76 19.90% 
Voting Respondents 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 418 100.00% 510 100.00% 382 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 889 47.02% 1002 50.90% 1208 31.62% 
Figure B-1.1.1: 
Figure B-1.2:
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Spain 
Figure B-2: 
SPAIN – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
 AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 3 0.23% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 12 1.95% 
25-34 6 0.45% 1 0.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 20 3.25% 
35-44 3 0.23% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 24 3.90% 
45-54 3 0.23% 1 0.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 20 3.25% 
55-64 0 0.00% 2 0.34% 0 0.00% 1 0.14% 16 2.60% 
65+ 2 0.15% 1 0.17% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 10 1.62% 
Eurosceptic Vote 17 1.29% 5 0.85% 0 0.00% 1 0.14% 102 16.56% 
Voting Respondents 1320 100.00% 585 100.00% 745 100.00% 693 100.00% 616 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 1972 66.94% 1000 58.50% 1208 61.67% 1000 69.30% 1097 56.15% 
 
Figure B-2.1: 
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France 
Table B-3: 
FRANCE – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
 AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 10 0.84% 4 0.96% 5 0.59% 5 0.75% 6 1.10% 
25-34 13 1.09% 12 2.88% 11 1.30% 5 0.75% 10 1.84% 
35-44 21 1.76% 10 2.40% 14 1.66% 4 0.60% 16 2.94% 
45-54 11 0.92% 13 3.13% 17 2.01% 7 1.05% 15 2.76% 
55-64 8 0.67% 12 2.88% 11 1.30% 8 1.20% 26 4.78% 
65+ 15 1.26% 14 3.37% 23 2.73% 0 0.00% 21 3.86% 
Eurosceptic Vote 78 6.55% 65 15.63% 81 9.60% 29 4.35% 94 17.28% 
Voting Respondents 1191 100.00% 416 100.00% 844 100.00% 666 100.00% 544 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 1995 59.70% 1020 40.78% 1406 60.03% 1000 66.60% 1137 47.85% 
Figure B-3.1: 
 
Figure B-3.2:
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Italy 
Table B-4: 
ITALY – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
 AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 42 2.21% 93 3.27% 13 0.91% 10 1.15% 16 1.97% 
25-34 49 2.58% 132 4.65% 21 1.48% 7 0.81% 32 3.93% 
35-44 34 1.79% 154 5.42% 60 4.22% 18 2.07% 42 5.16% 
45-54 48 2.52% 134 4.72% 65 4.57% 16 1.84% 39 4.79% 
55-64 26 1.37% 75 2.64% 72 5.06% 13 1.50% 21 2.58% 
65+ 36 1.89% 17 0.60% 53 3.73% 15 1.73% 17 2.09% 
Eurosceptic Vote 235 12.36% 605 21.30% 284 19.97% 79 9.10% 167 20.52% 
Voting Respondents 1902 100.00% 2840 100.00% 1422 100.00% 868 100.00% 814 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 2078 91.53% 9708 29.25% 1553 91.56% 1000 86.80% 1186 68.63% 
Figure B-4.1: 
 
Figure B-4.2: 
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Poland 
Table B-5: 
POLAND – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
 AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 8 2.45% 5 1.09% 16 3.51% 
25-34 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 11 3.37% 8 1.74% 16 3.51% 
35-44 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 9 2.76% 14 3.05% 18 3.95% 
45-54 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 25 7.67% 14 3.05% 28 6.14% 
55-64 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 19 5.83% 31 6.75% 47 10.31% 
65+ 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 32 9.82% 29 6.32% 38 8.33% 
Eurosceptic Vote 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 104 31.90% 101 22.00% 163 35.75% 
Voting Respondents 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 326 100.00% 459 100.00% 456 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 960 33.96% 1002 45.81% 1299 35.10% 
Figure B-5.1: 
 
Figure B-5.2: 
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Portugal  
Table B-6: 
PORTUGAL – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
  1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
AGE GROUP n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 0 0.00% 3 1.46% 10 1.54% 9 1.34% 2 0.37% 
25-34 0 0.00% 5 2.44% 7 1.08% 21 3.13% 6 1.12% 
35-44 0 0.00% 6 2.93% 19 2.92% 23 3.42% 20 3.74% 
45-54 0 0.00% 7 3.41% 20 3.07% 17 2.53% 18 3.36% 
55-64 0 0.00% 3 1.46% 9 1.38% 17 2.53% 21 3.93% 
65+ 0 0.00% 6 2.93% 7 1.08% 19 2.83% 28 5.23% 
Eurosceptic Vote 0 0.00% 30 14.63% 72 11.06% 106 15.77% 95 17.76% 
Voting Respondents 1503 100.00% 205 100.00% 651 100.00% 672 100.00% 535 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 1977 76.02% 500 41.00% 1000 65.10% 1000 67.20% 1132 47.26% 
Figure B-6.1: 
 
Figure B-6.2:
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Sweden  
Table B-7: 
SWEDEN – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 0 0.00% 6 2.45% 14 1.51% 11 1.33% 8 0.83% 
25-34 0 0.00% 3 1.22% 27 2.91% 37 4.48% 49 5.10% 
35-44 0 0.00% 4 1.63% 29 3.13% 32 3.88% 59 6.15% 
45-54 0 0.00% 13 5.31% 52 5.61% 29 3.52% 49 5.10% 
55-64 0 0.00% 5 2.04% 53 5.72% 31 3.76% 63 6.56% 
65+ 0 0.00% 5 2.04% 44 4.75% 28 3.39% 84 8.75% 
Eurosceptic Vote 0 0.00% 36 14.69% 219 23.62% 168 20.36% 312 32.50% 
Voting Respondents 0 0.00% 245 100.00% 927 100.00% 825 100.00% 960 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 0 0.00% 505 48.51% 2100 44.14% 1002 82.34% 1142 84.06% 
Figure B-7.1: 
 
Figure B-7.2: 
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United Kingdom  
Table B-8: 
UNITED KINGDOM – EUROSCEPTIC VOTE (EV) 
 AGE GROUP 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 
 n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV n % EV 
18-24 10 1.11% 7 2.19% 18 2.00% 11 1.85% 8 1.14% 
25-34 23 2.56% 13 4.08% 32 3.55% 28 4.71% 26 3.70% 
35-44 32 3.57% 30 9.40% 61 6.77% 48 8.08% 31 4.42% 
45-54 37 4.12% 26 8.15% 70 7.77% 46 7.74% 42 5.98% 
55-64 36 4.01% 30 9.40% 73 8.10% 61 10.27% 55 7.83% 
65+ 88 9.81% 41 12.85% 109 12.10% 77 12.96% 144 20.51% 
Eurosceptic Vote 226 25.20% 147 46.08% 363 40.29% 271 45.62% 306 43.59% 
Voting Respondents 897 100.00% 319 100.00% 901 100.00% 594 100.00% 702 100.00% 
Respondents & Estimated Turnout 2096 42.80% 956 33.37% 1498 60.15% 1000 59.40% 1369 51.28% 
Figure B-8.1: 
 
Figure B-8.2:
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